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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to systematically develop privacy heuristics for Online Social 
Network Services (SNS). In order to achieve this, we provide an analytical framework in which we 
characterize privacy breaches that have occurred in SNS and distinguish different stakeholders’ 
perspectives. Although SNS have been criticized for numerous grave privacy breaches, they have 
also proven to be an interesting space in which privacy design is implemented and critically taken 
up by users. Community involvement in the discovery of privacy breaches as well as in 
articulating privacy demands points to possibilities in user-driven privacy design. In our analysis 
we take a multilateral security analysis approach and identify conflicts in privacy interests and list 
points of intervention and negotiation. In our future research, we plan to validate the usefulness as 
well as the usability of these heuristics and to develop a framework for privacy design in SNS. 
Keywords:  Privacy, Social Software, Privacy Design, Privacy Negotiation, Systems Analysis and Design/ 
Development 
Résumé 
L’objectif de ce papier est de développer de manière systématique des heuristiques de 
confidentialité pour les services de réseaux sociaux en ligne. Dans ce but, nous analysons et 
catégorisons les brèches de confidentialité dans les réseaux sociaux et listons leurs propriétés 
spécifiques. Dans notre analyse, nous adoptons une approche par une analyse de sécurité 
multilatérale et nous identifions les conflits d’intérêt liés à la confidentialité ainsi que les points 
d’intervention et de négociation. 
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Introduction 
Over the past few years, a veritable profusion of SNS have appeared on the Internet, designed to prod, 'poke' and 
seduce users into confessing ever-greater amounts of personal information. Today, online social networks like 
Facebook or MySpace are radically redefining the nature of social interaction on the Internet, and accordingly the 
substance of the online public sphere as such. 
Socially, as well as economically, SNS are interesting. A number of disjoint user profiles floating around in 
cyberspace have limited worth, but once these profiles are associated with one another by means of 'relationships' 
their worth increases drastically for the owners of these profiles, and even more so for the providers. Microsoft's 
recent investment in Facebook valuated the latter at $16bn. With over 50 million users at the time, this put each 
Facebook user's worth at around $300.  
Ever since SNS became mainstream, they have been rebuked for playing an active role in the 'privacy nightmare' on 
the Internet. SNS are held responsible for the naive voluntary auto-profiling of Internet users. Users of SNS are 
accused of being uninformed, in contradiction with their privacy concerns, or simply giving in to a badly conceived 
trade-off between their privacy and functionality (Berendt et al. 2005). These viewpoints currently dominate the 
privacy debate on SNS in academia and the media.  
In this paper, we start with the assumption that SNS actually are an interesting space on the Internet for engaging in 
privacy (Albrechtslund 2008). By virtue of being public and popular, SNS make evident privacy problems elsewhere 
on the Internet e.g. emails, discussion forums, chats, e-commerce etc. In no other web applications are the user 
communities so actively involved in privacy debates. We also assume that privacy is not something concrete, in 
consensus and in constant danger. Rather, we conceive privacy as a set of practices to negotiate which should 
remain public or private in social contexts (Phillips, 2004). Legal and other regulatory frameworks and various 
social mechanisms are there to ensure that individuals can practice their privacy (Gutwirth 2002, Nissenbaum 2004). 
We are concerned with the translation of these “privacy practices” into a software engineering problem. Although by 
now privacy research is well established in different sub-fields of computer science, the systematic application of 
those results while engineering information systems remains an open research field. For example, security engineers 
have developed Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs), identity management systems (Hansen et al. 2004) and 
privacy metrics; data miners have studied privacy preserving data mining methods (Vaida 2006); usability engineers 
developed usable privacy designs (Jensen 2005) etc. But, how and when should we apply this plethora of privacy 
tools and methods and which privacy breaches do these tools exactly engage with? 
Universal definitions of privacy or definitions of privacy reduced to confidentiality are not adequate points of 
departure for engineering systems. Rather, it is important to determine what counts as privacy concerns from the 
perspectives of the different stakeholders in a specific domain. SNS, our domain of interest, contain both examples 
of breaches general to the Internet, as well as breaches that are specific to these applications.  A deeper 
understanding of these specific privacy concerns from the perspective of the different stakeholders and possible 
design solutions to them is the topic of this paper. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses major privacy breaches picked up by the SNS 
community and media. For each breach we map out the properties of the breaches. We group these into four main 
categories: indeterminate visibility, separation of identities, contested ownership and misappropriation, and propose 
design heuristics and other non-technical measures to protect against each. We conclude by discussing our results 
and pointing to future research. 
Privacy Design through Analysis of Common Privacy Breaches in SNS 
SNS are not free of common privacy breaches like communication intrusion, identity theft, phishing, stalking, 
information leakage etc. (ENISA 2007). However, certain characteristics of SNS open up possibilities for new kinds 
of privacy breaches. These breaches primarily result from the fact that users reveal detailed information to the public 
and map their real-life social relationships more explicitly than they would in emails or on public forums. 
At the same time, these public revelations have an advantage when it comes to privacy. Users act as a community to 
notice and inform each other of privacy problems and on ways to avoid them. They use their relationships to put 
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pressure on SNS providers to make the relevant changes. Furthermore, user interaction might help to identify 
conflict in privacy interests, leading users to ask for mechanisms to negotiate these conflicts. In this sense, SNS are 
an interesting domain for promoting privacy practices on the Internet that are not only motivated by the profit 
interests of providers. They therefore provide an interesting opportunity for doing user-driven privacy design.  
In the following we introduce our analytical framework for SNS privacy breaches. Methodologically, the analysis is 
a result of three studies. First, we studied literature defining different analytical frameworks on privacy breaches in 
information systems. In parallel, we studied prominent privacy breaches that occurred in Facebook and Myspace – 
two popular, and similar, SNS. In a cyclical manner, we refined our categorization of privacy breaches to the final 
four presented here and classified the different breaches under those categories.  
The four categories are based on discussions of characteristics of privacy breaches by Phillips (2004), Braman 
(2006), Nissenbaum (2004) and Solove (2007). Phillips argues for the importance of negotiating the line between 
the public and the private. Solove classifies legally accepted cases of privacy breaches in the USA under the 
categories: information collection, processing and dissemination. Nissenbaum brings an alternative to universal 
accounts of privacy and breaches with her notion of contextual integrity. She argues that contexts are governed by 
information norms: norms of appropriateness and norms of flow or distribution. Lastly, Braman points to problems 
that arise under surveillance in combination with privacy technologies. These she calls misappropriation by 
memory, perturbation, abandonment of accuracy, and inference attacks.  
The privacy breaches we study are selected from a greater pool of privacy breaches in SNS mentioned in news and 
the blogosphere. We conducted a series of queries in google news and digg.com1 for articles published between 
October 2007 and March 2008 on privacy breaches in SNS. Of the 154 articles returned in digg and 380 articles 
returned in google, 55 in digg an 69 in google discussed privacy breaches which we tagged. The figures below show 
tag-clouds from those news articles, bigger words representing higher tag frequency. 
 
          Figure 1.Google result tag-cloud            Figure 2. Digg result tag-cloud 
 
An emphasis of our framework is on the multilateral analysis of the privacy concerns of the stakeholders of social 
networks. Namely, we analyze privacy issues that arise among users, between users and SNS providers and between 
users and third party service providers.  
Finally, our design solutions to the privacy breaches are supported by literature on privacy research in computer 
science as well as some critical points raised by Gutwirth (2002), Braman(2006) and Nissenbaum (2004). 
Breaches related to Indeterminate Visibility 
With indeterminate visibility we denote the problem of a user's profile information being visible to others without 
the user's explicit knowledge or approval. Given that SNS users want to make their information available such that 
their audiences can find them, this breach often arises after users volitionally but unwittingly publicize information 
to a wider audience than they actually intended. The indeterminate visibility problem arises for a number of reasons:  
Poor usability: although all SNS offer some privacy controls by now, the functional effects are often not transparent 
enough. Previous studies suggest that users often use default settings (Mackay 1991, Gross 2005). Studies on 
Facebook suggest that users unwittingly make mistakes in their privacy configurations, find them time consuming 
(Lipford et al. 2008), or simply assume that their profiles are private (Rosenblum 2007).  
                                                          
1
 Google news: http://news.google.com, dig: http://www.digg.com 
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Promoting profile publicity: SNS providers have an interest in the wide release of data to a greater audience and to 
third-party providers. In its Privacy Policy (PP), Facebook admits that part of the user profiles may be made 
available to third party search engines (Facebook PP 2008). This may conflict with the users’ interest to determine 
the visibility of their data, is likely to cause indeterminate visibility and requires legal as well as social intervention. 
Relational information: Relational information is any information that is controlled by multiple users. Different 
users may have different or even conflicting visibility settings on their relational information. A good example of a 
relational information related conflict is the trail of crumbs left by users when they visit other users' profiles. 
StudiVZ.net users (StudiVZ 2008) can see which other users visit their profiles. StudiVZ allows users to turn that 
feature off, and invisibly browse through other users' profile pages. A conflict arises here: the owner of a profile 
may want to know who has visited their profiles, whereas the visitor may want that visit to remain anonymous.  
Transitive access control: Social networks can easily be modeled as graphs with nodes representing users and edges 
represent relationships among users. With transitive access control we denote the granting of access to resources 
based on the existence of a path of certain degree in the network between two users. Therefore, making a resource 
visible to friends of friends (FoF) of user A, allows all users with a path the length of 2 to A to see her resources. In 
such a case, the visibility of certain information is co-defined by friends of A. Especially considering that in 
networks with small world properties, transitive visibility may result in revelations to the complete network, 
transitive access control contributes to indeterminate visibility. A bug in Facebook actually proved such danges 
when it revealed unique album ids when commented. This made private albums visible to the whole network. 
Finally, using different depths of transitive access control on different resources might lead to unintended 
information revelation or concealment. 
Privacy Design Heuristics 
Enhancing usability: A privacy-friendly design should explicitly require users to opt-in before profiles are made 
publicly visible. This goes hand in hand with numerous recommendations of privacy legislation and guidelines. 
Degrees of opting-in should support users in getting out of the trap of submitting all their information as a trade-off 
for functionality. At the same time, over-protective privacy settings should not limit users’ freedom of activity.   
The usability of privacy settings should be part of the design and validation process. Still, providing privacy settings 
should not absolve providers, third parties or even communities of their responsibilities. A multilateral security and 
privacy requirements analysis should be used to determine the distribution of privacy responsibilities (Gürses 2006). 
Possible measures to alleviate indeterminate visibility breaches of privacy include clearly showing the visibility of 
each private object ('only friends are allowed to see this information', or 'only you can see this'). There is a need to 
define standardized visual cues for data that is public or private. Furthermore, SNS providers should provide easy to 
use tutorials and tips on privacy settings for users, as well as extended options for the more privacy-aware users. 
Relational information negotiation: relational information problems, like the conflict between "visitor anonymity" 
vs. "profile privacy", as in the case of trail of crumbs, should be made explicit. Negotiation should be made possible 
and visual cues should inform users of these conflicts and ways of negotiating them.  
Provider user negotiation: privacy settings in SNS can also provide users the possibility to negotiate their visibility 
with providers. Usability, context based vs. centralized privacy settings, legal enforcement of settings, as well as the 
complexities of relational information have to be taken into account when designing privacy settings for user-
provider negotiation of privacy. 
Simplifying Transitive Access Control: Transitive access control, which becomes even trickier when multiple layers 
of data have varying degrees of transitivity, poses demanding and interesting information theoretical inference 
problems. A systematic evaluation and validation of privacy settings with transitive access control is necessary. 
Currently, this kind of analysis is done ad-hoc by interested users – users communicate to confirm the visibility of 
resources despite their privacy settings. Visual cues i.e. this is the graph of all friends of friends and they can see 
these resources, can be used to inform users of the reaches of transitive access control. 
Indeterminate visibility breaches are related but not limited to the security goal of confidentiality. Confidentiality 
guarantees that only authorized persons have access to the information in a system. Confidentiality is monotonic, 
once information has been revealed, the confidentiality of that information cannot be restored. The containment of 
visibility can be less strict. Users may decide to change the visibility of their profile as a part of their privacy goals. 
The concealment of previously public information or vice versa may be part of the privacy negotiation process. 
Therefore, the design of privacy needs to go beyond the security engineering view of confidentiality preservation. 
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Nevertheless, the validation of the transitive access control settings has to be done diligently. 
Breaches related to Separation of Digital Identities and Aggregation 
Separation of identities is the term used to refer to the construction of social identities by individuals that selectively 
reveal and conceal information in specific contexts and roles (Phillips 2004, Nissenbaum 2004). On the internet, 
separation of digital identities can be comparable and is as easily established as breached in SNS. We distinguish 
between two kinds of separation of identities in SNS. 
Internal separation of digital identities: is about allowing users the freedom to strategically reveal different profile 
information to different persons in their SNS. Aggregation of data may easily breach users’ internal separation of 
identities. One such breach happened in the early version of Facebook's feeds. Users were unaware that their 
information was being collected, aggregated, and posted to their friend's feeds (Boyd 2006).  
External separation of digital identities: is about the ability of an individual to create multiple profiles on a given 
SNS or in different digital environments. We distinguish two kinds of privacy breaches in this respect: 
1.User driven external separation breaches: These have to do with the advent of open standards and the possibility 
to exchange ones social graph between various SNS. What users make available to friends on one network is not 
necessarily something that they want to make available to friends on another network. This applies particularly to 
users' profiles on informal networks (Facebook, MySpace) where the settings might be looser, and the same users' 
profiles on professional networks (LinkedIn, Xing) where they might want to present themselves more formally. 
2.Provider driven breaches: 'Facebook Beacon' is an example of a breach of external separation of identities driven 
by providers, including third party providers. Beacon is a tracking system, integrated on external platforms. It 
reports user activities to Facebook and informs a user's contacts of those activities. Facebook originally marketed 
Beacon to potential businesses by stating ‘The user can choose to opt out of the story, but the user doesn't need to 
take any action for the story to be published on Facebook’ (Facebook Beacon 2007). User outrage led them to 
rethink their privacy policy, and that statement was replaced by ‘The user must proactively consent to have a story 
from your website published’ (Facebook Beacon 2008)2. 
Privacy Design Heuristics 
Managing internal separation of digital identities: Allowing users to have groups of friends and set visibility rights 
to each group is important to achieve internal separation of identities. Facebook has recently implemented highly 
granular access control settings enhancing internal separation of identities. Nevertheless, smart grouping methods 
and increasing the usability of such “end-user privacy administration” tasks is necessary. 
The management of internal separation of identities can be enhanced through mirrors of the user’s different profiles. 
This feature, once activated, could show what for example a friend vs. a colleague can see of the user, reflecting 
their various identities in the “mirror”. Reflective features generally could help to visualize for the user his or her 
data traces before they are published. 
A privacy-aware broadcast feature like the Facebook mini-feed could allow users more granular approval for the 
information they release in the feed. The approval feature could include details like which of their friends, or which 
groups of friends are allowed to see each feed. The recent introduction of ‘lists’, which allow Facebook users to 
group and categorize their contacts, is a good first step in that direction. Additionally, frequent and detailed prompts 
for data release approval may be critical to the usability of the privacy functionality. In response, users may prefer to 
turn off the functionality or revert to default settings, leading to privacy breaches (Lederer et al. 2004). The complete 
deactivation of such broadcast features must be available to the users. 
Managing and guaranteeing external separation of digital identities: Providers may breach external separation of 
digital identities when different profiles of a user hosted by cooperating providers contain common identifying 
information. SNS therefore is a domain in which users can make use of linkability analysis tools and related identity 
partitioning tools (Berthold et al. 2007; Borcea et al. 2005). These tools can help users in managing multiple 
pseudonymous accounts in case the providers collaborate and alert users when two pseudonyms can easily be linked. 
                                                          
2
 Later announcements from privacy activists show that the opt-in is not only lacking, but also that Beacon 
continued to aggregate data. The data was simply not being shown to users’ friends anymore. 
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Features that effect external separation of identities need to allow users complete control over what information is 
shared, with whom, and how. Providers should also make global deactivation easily accessible and usable. This is in 
stark contrast to Beacon’s original purchase-by-purchase or vendor-by-vendor opt-out solution. In case users opt-in 
to cross-platform aggregation to be published on their SNS, the one-by-one approval function can be applied.  
The overload from managing multiple platform aggregation may be diminished using P3P like policies (Preibusch et 
al. 2007). The aggregate data should be subject to previously defined guidelines, e.g. the Fair Information Practices 
(OECD 1980). We nevertheless beg caution, since policies and guidelines have little or no meaning if the necessary 
legal and social standards are not there to accompany them (Möller 2003). 
External separations of identities breaches caused by porting social graphs across platforms require new negotiation 
mechanisms. Friends in one network must be able to refuse to be listed as friends in another. In this sense, the 
release of such information external to the original SNS is similar to an external transitive access control and 
requires further studies. 
Breaches related to Contested Ownership 
With contested ownership we describe the explicit and implicit definitions of data ownership that may lead to 
privacy breaches. Specifically, we distinguish between contested ownership issues upon joining and leaving an SNS. 
Provider contestation of data ownership: Users practically surrender their “right to be let alone” as soon as they sign 
up to an SNS. The conditions of this deliverance are set up in SNS policy documents and often merge the provider’s 
right to circulate the content world-wide and the ownership of the data. For example, Facebook's Terms of Use 
states: 'When you post User Content to the Site, you authorize and direct us to make such copies thereof as we deem 
necessary [...] By posting user content you grant the company an Irrevocable, perpetual, transferable license to use, 
copy, publicly perform, publicly display, excerpt and distribute such User Content for any purpose, commercial, 
advertising…' (Facebook ToU 2008). This statement actually accompanies another one suggesting that 'Facebook 
does not assert any ownership over your User Content'. Policy documents that are within themselves contradictory 
leave users in despair as to exactly what ownership means on SNS. 
The complications in ownership with respect to relational information and aggregated data are often not addressed in 
privacy policies. It is usual that privacy policies pose the question of ownership as one that is between a single user 
and the provider of the SNS. This produces a grey zone with respect to data that belongs to many. Especially in the 
case of the aggregate data it is assumed that SNS providers reserve the right to all aggregated data and derivatives 
thereof. We will address aggregate data further in the Section on misappropriation. 
User contestations of relational information ownership: Once the SNS membership is established, users inevitably 
start producing relational information. Relational information, as defined earlier, results in ownership 
interdependency. Who will identify when relational information will be visible, to whom, who will be able to alter 
and finally delete that information? For example, user A wants to publicize all her activities. She comments one of 
friend B’s photos, only visible to friends. May A: publicize that she commented? show the content of the comment? 
the picture that was commented? Who actually owns the comment? So, whose privacy settings should this comment 
subscribe to, to that of the author of the comment, or the owner of the commented photo?  
The ownership interdependency issue also occurs with regards to tags and links. Many SNS nowadays allow users to 
tag uploaded content. On photos, owners can tag a specific part of the photo and associate it with a friend by linking 
it to their profile. On face value, these tags confirm the presence of the tagged user on the SNS and link to his 
profile. As soon as a photo is tagged, the ownership questions arise by virtue of being relational information. 
Profile removals and contestations of ownership: If SNS policies per default ask for a license to circulate profile 
information widely and to share it with third parties, it remains unclear exactly how the removal of a profile effects 
the circulated copies. Even worse, Facebook asserts in their Terms of Use that removing User Content amounts to an 
expiration of that license. But, how exactly User Content is removed is not explained. Actually, deleting an account 
in Facebook, as opposed to deactivating it, is a long and tedious process. Upon simple deactivation, the data remains 
on the servers. Users must go through a complicated process to delete their profile, including personally contacting 
Facebook staff, and in some cases, sending legal letters (Aspan 2008). 
Finally, the ownership interdependency conflicts arise when a user decides to leave her SNS. Should all relational 
information related to her be deleted? How does that affect the privacy and the integrity of the interdependent users? 
All of these questions also arise when providers remove user profiles in response to breaches of their Terms of Use. 
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Privacy Design Heuristics 
Distinguishing ownership from circulation rights: Privacy policies in SNS should distinguish between circulation of 
profile information and the ownership of data. If user data is going to be handled other than to make it available 
throughout multiple servers and mirrored sites, then the purpose of data use should be clearly stated. 
Negotiating user-user interdependency: The interdependent ownership calls for negotiation mechanisms and the 
establishment of community standards. A simple solution to interdependent ownership would be to adopt the 
strictest settings that any of the involved users have. An alternative would involve the SNS to inform both parties of 
the ramifications of that particular interaction e.g. allowing user B to comment on this photo will make that photo 
available to her friends due to her current feed settings. Similarly, Myspace has a simple and elegant solution to 
tagging in photos. The users first have to accept photos tagged with them before those tags are made public. This is 
in stark contrast to Facebook, which allows automatic tagging, all the while allowing the tagged user to remove the 
tag. None of these basic solutions involve actual negotiations that would allow the users to decide together the 
visibility and treatment of relational information. That will be part of our future research in this field. 
Removal of profiles and user negotiation: Leaving the SNS implies that the user's basic information, profile (and any 
comments made by others on that profile), uploaded content such as photos and videos (and any comments to those), 
their contact lists, their presence on other people's contact lists, and all other content be removed. This has an impact 
on the integrity of the other profiles. An interesting design solution would be to allow users to distinguish between 
kinds of relational information. Relational information is about sharing. In real life, sharing sometimes means 
lending something, in others it means giving something away i.e. like a gift. User may therefore be provided with 
functionality that specifies the conditions of ownership in relational information in a playful manner. 
Removal of profiles and provider responsibility: Deletion of the data when a user removes their profile is the 
responsibility of the providers. Legal frameworks should make providers responsible for the complete deletion of 
profiles, which will inevitably have an impact on the sharing of the data with third parties. A good example in this 
direction is the user-friendly Terms of Service (ToS) and Privacy Policy (PP) of MySpace (MySpace TOS 2008 
MySpace PP 2008). MySpace states that a user is in sole control of their data, albeit while asserting that the SNS has 
the right to use that data in some ways. They state that any use of PII (personally Identifiable Information) will only 
be done after informing users of the purpose, and receiving authorization from them. 
Breaches related to Misappropriation 
By misappropriation we refer to the use of SNS data out of context or for previously undefined purposes. This 
problem is typically manifested between users and providers, or users and third-parties, and rarely among users. 
Misappropriation often takes place on the aggregation of all user-interactions on the SNS: the network information 
i.e. the complete social graph, the user profiles and the user interactions. In its extreme case, this includes the 
aggregation of data from multiple providers.  
Data mining and categorization: Results of data mining on network information can reveal additional information 
about users. Where is the user located in the network, is the user a desired customer; a connector between 
communities; participating in a community of interest that is of commercial or of other surveillance value? All of 
these observations are based on aggregate traces and information provided by users. But, it is assumed that this 
information is beyond users’ control and is not related to their privacy.  
The unwanted uses of network data that leads to discrimination of individuals based on categorization in population 
groups are seen as breaches of categorization privacy. The problems attached to surveilling networks and the 
resulting categorizations has often been ignored by the privacy debates (Nissenbaum 2004) but picked up by those in 
surveillance studies (Phillips 2004, Graham et al. 2003, Braman 2006)  
Facebook actually provides a privacy option which allows users to turn off "social advertising", but nowhere do they 
state, exactly what part of users' "social data" or graph they observe for this kind of advertisement and what happens 
if friends in the same social graph have conflicting configurations. 
Third-party provider misappropriation and relational information: A recent example of misappropriation concerns 
Facebook “apps”3 . Apps require full access to profile information before users can interact with them. Facebook 
                                                          
3
 Apps are third-party applications that use an API provided by facebook to introduce new features and build on 
existing ones.  
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advises users to “use […] applications at [their] own risk” and provides apps with all profile information with no 
possibility for the user to set limitations. Since users have to proactively install an app, and explicitly consent to the 
use of their profile information, one could argue that this is not a case of misappropriation. However the recent 
discovery that apps then also gain access to sensitive information about their users’ friends catapults this problem.  
Facebook Beacon, another important example, misappropriates the mini-feed to indirectly market products to the 
friends of a user who made a purchase (Hill et al. 2006). This is an example of appropriation, “the use of the data 
subject’s identity to serve the aims and interests of another” (Solove 2007). 
Uninformed misappropriation: Beacons misappropriation of data was public by virtue of the properties of the 
application, although the technical implementtion and the complete effect of the feature remains a “trade secret”. 
Recognizing misappropriation is a matter of expertise, if not impossible. It was only through multiple interventions 
publicized in blogs by experts that it became evident that Beacon uses a combination of cookies and pixels at partner 
sites that invoke javascript. A deeper analysis showed that Beacon contains further unwanted side-effects like 
tracking users that are off-line (Bertaeu 2008) and linking users with wrong information (Li 07). 
Privacy Design Heuristics 
Opening network information to scrutiny: OECD guidelines can be applied also to network information in SNS: 
Users can be informed on which part of their information has been shared and with whom, and have the right to 
scrutinize, edit or delete this information. Mechanisms can also be implemented to encourage users to scrutinize 
aggregate data and resulting categories, make corrections, or delete themselves out of unwanted categories. 
Information overload and the required expertise may inhibit such engagement. Revealing network information 
would also reveal information about other users. Even if the network is revealed anonymously, it may be possible to 
devise attacks and reidentify users (Backstorm et al. 2007). Using stronger anonymization techniques, especially 
those based on perturbation, would in return raise questions about the authenticity and accountability of data 
(Braman 2006). Transparency of network information is nevertheless an interesting question for future research. 
Engaging the public: Misappropriation, albeit less flashy than the other categories of privacy breaches, is a silent 
assassin. In reality, only the providers themselves know about their doings with network information. SNS providers 
rely on that wealth of information for value creation. The more information they have on their users, their users' 
interactions, social graphs, habits, wishes, and purchases, the more these users are worth to potential partners of that 
provider. Users by now also know that once their information is 'out there', it is in one way or another public. 
Nevertheless, as more misappropriation stories hit the news and the users become aware, it will become inevitable to 
think about privacy design with respect to the use of network information.  
Conclusion 
There are three main contributions in this paper. Firstly, we consider privacy as a set of practices in negotiating the 
public and private divide. In that sense we depart from the view of privacy as confidentiality often encountered in 
computer science. From this perspective we lay the groundwork for dealing with privacy concerns systematically 
during systems engineering. We focus on the domain of SNS where conflicts and negotiation are central.  
Secondly, we propose an analytical framework for characterizing privacy breaches in SNS. The analytical 
framework is based on characterizations of digital privacy in literature and news on privacy breaches in SNS. It 
includes an investigation of the properties of prominent breaches in SNS and how they are inter-related. 
The categories in our framework are interdependent but they point out different aspects of privacy breaches. For 
example, if ownership is contested, then it is difficult for a user to determine the visibility of relational information. 
Misappropriation and indeterminate visibility often result in the breach of separation of identities etc. Nevertheless, 
the differences are helpful in conceiving the necessary privacy design heuristics. Those privacy design heuristics and 
discussions on their advantages and disadvantages make up the final contribution of this paper. 
Clearly, neither the list of breaches nor the suggested privacy design heuristics are complete. In our text we pointed 
to important topics that require future research. We expect that as users are better informed about the inner workings 
of SNS and better articulate their privacy needs, providers will have increasing pressure to engage in privacy design. 
In which case, this analysis will have to be repeated.  
An important issue we will look into next is whether, and why, providers would be willing to offer more privacy 
features, when the availability of user data is what gives their networks their value. Possible drivers for SNS 
providers include user retention, avoiding bad publicity which can lead to monetary loss, industry standards, 
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adhering to potential relevant legislation, or simply ethics (the age of “do no evil”). 
In order to deal with privacy conflicts more systematically, we will extend a method on multilateral security 
requirements engineering (Gürses 2006) as well as study agile design methodologies. Our long-term objective is to 
develop an agile framework for privacy design that would combine the negotiations and conflict resolution strategies 
mentioned in this paper, as well as agile development methodologies. Such a framework would allow providers and 
consumers to collaborate on developing and improving privacy aspects of social networks to the benefit of all. 
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